Bulgaria and Romania are neighbouring countries, which have always been rivals. Following the decision on EU enlargement to include Bulgaria and Romania (late 1999) and with membership negotiations already started (2004), the race between the two countries gained momentum and comparisons of performances in the areas of economy and democracy became a regular practice. Around late 1990s the two countries took different trajectories, although in the direction of EU and market economy. The great divergence is lying primarily in the choice of monetary regime. While Romania continued to pursue and enhance its discretionary monetary policy and since 2005 has moved to inflation targeting, Bulgaria made an abrupt turn in mid-1997 and introduced a currency board arrangement.
I. Introduction
Bulgaria and Romania are neighbouring countries, which have always been rivals. Their fates have intertwined on many occasions in history as in the time of the Ottoman rule or within the socialist bloc; often at war -sometimes as allies, other times as enemies fighting against each other (during the latest history one vivid example is the Inter-Ally War of 1913, or the two World Wars). Their rivalry, this time in peaceful environment, continued after the disintegration of communism. Initially, it was which of the two would be quicker to depart from the past and which would outdo the other in adopting the institutions and catching up with the standard of living in Western democracies (i.e., which would make "the transition to market economy and democratic world" earlier). At a later stage, in mid-1990s, the competition was about which would be faster and more successful in integrating into the European Union. The very philosophy of EU enlargement, which was the outcome of disintegration of the bipolar world, presupposed the principle of competition and strife between the member-states expected to demonstrate and achieve certain results. It was presumed that this would create incentives for development, discipline and innovation. How successful this philosophy was, is difficult to judge definitely, even more so when taking into account the difficulties of realisation of its alternatives. Alternative in a sense in building transitional forms for erstwhile socialist countries to cooperate and share common monetary, economic and even political to some extent institutions which, as the processes evolved, would "merge into" the European systems 1 .
Following the decision on EU enlargement to include Bulgaria and Romania (late 1999) and with membership negotiations already started (2004) , the race between the two countries gained momentum and comparisons of performances in the areas of economy and democracy became a regular practice 2 . Since the two countries joined the EU (2007) their rivalry has 1 An example of a similar idea is the proposal of Jacques Attali, who in early 1990 advised the creation of a payment union between the former European socialist countries based on the ECU that would help them avoid exchange rate disruptions and smoothly adopt the monetary institutions of the West. 2 Respectively in February and March 1993 the European Union signed with Romania and Bulgaria, respectively, association agreements, or "European Agreements", as a first step to the membership negotiations, never stopped, fostered by their aspirations for more influence within EU, in particular for euro funds reception, for admission to the euro area by way of achieving nominal and real convergence, and recently, for overcoming the global crisis.
Having followed relatively similar models of development, around late 1990s, more precisely 1996/1997, the two countries took different trajectories, although in the direction of EU and market economy. The great divergence is lying primarily in the choice of monetary regime.
While Romania continued to pursue and enhance its discretionary monetary policy and since 2005 has moved to inflation targeting, Bulgaria made an abrupt turn in mid-1997 and introduced a currency board arrangement. The currency board, which operates to this day, is an extreme orthodox form of monetary regime resembling the gold-exchange standard, a negation in principle of monetary policy 3 . The two radically different monetary regimes were in operation when the two countries gained their EU membership and later on, when the current crisis began. These regimes contributed to shaping the behaviour of economic players, the academia, and the public consciousness, building up and structuring their preferences to such an extent that today it is almost impossible to find a Romanian who would object to the active monetary policy, or a Bulgarian, who would disapprove of the currency board and would rather have a "Romanian" monetary policy conducted instead.
In late 1990s, and especially in early 2000, the two economies witnessed a period of economic upswing and growth, which ended abruptly in the last months of 2008 when it became clear that the initial hopes for decoupling of the European peripheral countries were in vain 4 , and that the crisis reached the Balkans.
In our view, the theoretical and practical interest in comparing the two countries and their evolution over the period 2000 -2010 is unquestionably motivating, especially because it is rarely undertaken. It has relevance for a number of reasons at least.
First, it arouses one's curiosity as to why Bulgaria and Romania chose to operate two radically different regimes in late 1990s despite their similar development at the onset of transition and the fact that they were in for a similar future -EU membership. How was it that this only a little more than a year after signing such agreements with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia (December 1991) . 3 See Schuler (2007) , Desquibet and Nenovsky (2004) . 4 See Sanfey (2010) , Gardo and Martin (2010) .
the two regimes penetrated so deep in the mass consciousness so as to shape peculiar cognitive type models of how money and monetary authorities function and the way they should function?
Second, it would be interesting to see to what extent the diametrically opposite monetary choices have determined the overall development of the two countries given that the monetary institution is system making and money is at the core of the institutional structure of society 5 .
At a more concrete level, the question is about how and by what mechanisms the monetary regime impacts fundamental behaviours such as saving and investment, the correlation between domestic and foreign saving, the condition of public finances, the overall level of debt and the debt structure, credit behaviour and credit structure, etc.? In other words, it would be interesting to investigate whether and to what extent the monetary regime is neutral over a long as well as short-term horizon in relation to the achievements and characteristics of the economies, something which is often upheld by one group of economists and just as often challenged by another.
Third, the comparative perspective allows us to see the effects of the two opposite monetary regimes by taking account of the fact that the other characteristics of the two countries in late 1990s, when the choice was made, were relatively the same and an upshot of the communist legacy. To put it otherwise, we are witnessing a kind of a natural experiment, whereby it is possible, under certain conditions, of course, to judge about the efficiency and impact of the two opposite monetary regimes: how much these regimes have contributed to the formation of the specific profiles of the two economies; the dynamics and forms of the economic upsurge after 2002, and the extent to which they have moulded resilience and adaptability of the two economies to the current crisis. The fourth theoretical point, which could be highlighted by comparing the development of Bulgaria and Romania, and which is often overlooked, is the institutional complementarity of the monetary regime with the other economic and political institutions, i.e., their systemic character. The institutional analysis of the economies in transition over the last ten years has achieved significant results; however quantification of institutions and institutional reforms is still rarely performed (on the subject see Coricelli and Maurel, 2010) . In this analysis we examine in more detail the compatibility of the monetary regime with the expectations for membership and EU membership itself, as well as how much the currency board (Bulgaria) or the discretionary monetary policy (Romania) fits or conflicts with the process of euro integration, given that the monetary regime and the Euro membership are specific basic social anchors. In other words, we enquire into the nature of the dynamics of interaction between these two anchors 6 .
And fifth, the period of prosperity and crisis under review, 2000 -2010, allows us to make some parallels with another decade associated with the years of the Great Depression between the Two World Wars. The years from 1925 to 1940 are strikingly reminiscent of today's developments. In spite of the existing differences, they allow us to explore a range of theoretical and empirical hypotheses, and provide ground for reflection on the existence of certain cyclic recurrence and repeating (not deterministic) patterns of a number of economic behaviours and country preferences. It may as well be a sheer coincidence, but the above decade reveals similar to today's differences between Bulgaria and Romania, more specifically with regard to the preferences for monetary regime and fiscal policy. In spite of the difficulties, Bulgaria steadfastly adhered to the principles of the gold-exchange standard (Bulgaria introduced it de facto in 1926 and de jure in 1928). Romania carried out a monetary and financial stabilisation somewhat later (with some delay); it introduced the gold-exchange standard in 1929 and devalued in 1936 following the devaluation of the French franc.
Similarly, today, Bulgaria is obsessed with compliance with fiscal discipline and strictly 6 On the subject see an earlier study by Ialnazov and Nenovsky (2011), and Nenovsky (2010) services its external debt obligations (is perhaps the strictest payer of all countries with reparations), whereas Romania defaulted in 1933. In 1931 the two countries introduced a systematic exchange control, which is often considered as de facto abandoning of the basic principle of the gold-exchange standard, namely the free movement of gold and foreign currency (Wandschneider, 2008, p. 155) . Things are much more complex, and the exchange control in the two countries could be interpreted mainly as a temporary safeguard of the gold standard, as a reaction against the devaluation of the British pound and the currencies that followed suit, as a needed protection of the country's gold reserve and manageable servicing of the external debt. The case in point is not about abandoning the principles and philosophy of the gold standard, but rather of negating the principles and philosophy of the floating exchange rate and managed money. Although in these years monetary orthodoxy was still wide spread, as well as a legacy of the pre-war classical period of gold standard and fiscal discipline, we can claim that the views and behaviour of Bulgarian economists and bankers are relatively more orthodox than those of their Romanian counterparts are. On the whole, the ideas of "managed money" (upravliavana moneta in Bulgarian and monede operat in Romanian) and of different types of industrial policy and protectionism were received much more readily in Romania than in Bulgaria (let us recall the international popularity enjoyed by Mihail Manoilescu's theory on new protectionism). Of course, later on all differences were left to the past with the two countries taking the road of wartime economy and war preparations. Going back in history to the time of the Great Depression makes it possible to discover and explain the recurring economic and political choices of the two countries, if we are disinclined to accept them as curious repetitions of the situation today (part 4).
In this study, after exposing the history of Bulgarian and Romanian monetary regimes (part 2)
we attempt to build analytical framework first theoretically, where we put forward our hypotheses, then empirically by illustrating them with statistical data and examples from the political economy of the two countries (Part 3). In this way, we seek to contribute to the development of the larger discussion of the differences across economic systems, in the case of the Balkan countries, the post-communist economies, or capitalism in general. As well as indirectly -to the analysis and explanation of the diversity and variety within the European Union, their forms, causes and implications for the overall European economic and monetary policy. From a much broader perspective, our study elaborates the meeting point between the general theoretical explanation and formalisation on the one hand, and the historical concrete and contextual manifestation, on the other.
II. The battle of monetary regimes: Currency board versus Monetary policy
As was already pointed out above, our focus is on the two opposite monetary regimes chosen by Bulgaria and Romania in late 1990s. The debate about the choice of monetary regimes, and their relative efficiency according to the countries' characteristics, the interrelation between credibility and flexibility, the types of shocks, etc. is old and publications are numerous. So very numerous in fact that as one Arab scholar from the past once said: "Oh Allah, help me from drowning in so many names". In order to avoid drowning in the sea of names, we will give a brief overview of the history of monetary regimes in Bulgaria and Romania, without discussing in details the major achievements of the theory of monetary regimes.
After around a seven-year period of active discretionary monetary policy (1989-1996/97) 
in
Bulgaria and an extremely deep financial, monetary and subsequently political crisis, in late 1996 and early 1997 a decision was taken for the introduction of a currency board arrangement. Although debates as to who initiated Currency board continues to the present day. Since the beginning was clear that it was IMF and the country's major creditors (which is where the loans for building a start-up foreign reserve of the currency board initially came from), who wished to see a stable and credible monetary regime in place as well as a country able to service its external debt (currency boards have a high propensity to accumulate foreign reserves). The new arrangement agreed with the desires of the poor and middle strata of the population who lost money in the hyperinflation and the failure of banks. From a macroeconomic and institutional perspective, Bulgaria needed a break from the prolonged developments of bandit transition in which through the banking system and the central bank losses were monetised and assets and liabilities, legacy from planned economy, were illegally and unfairly redistributed 7 . Bulgarian economy was in a non-cooperative game equilibrium, similar to prisoner dilemma (Ialnazov and Nenovsky, 2011) .
As is known, a currency board is an extremely restrictive monetary system in which the monetary policy is practically eliminated with the exception of statutory reserve management and regulation of the banking system. Law fixes the exchange rate, and monetary base is fully covered by highly liquid foreign asset, the coverage being made public weekly through the release of the Currency Board balance sheet. The LOLR function in Bulgaria has been reduced to specified situations of systemic risk, as determined by means of defined levels of the condition of the payment system, and within the surplus of the foreign reserves over the liabilities of Issue Department. The essential here is to remember that on the asset side of the currency board's balance sheet there are no domestic assets, no securities of the Bulgarian government, or claims on the banking sector. This makes monetary policy as we know it (open market operations, etc.) impossible 8 . The currency board is similar to (as well as different from) the gold-exchange standard, relying on the two major effects -credibility and discipline 9 .
It is worth noting that the currency board was introduced after a deep crisis (according to some calculations, one of the severest crisis in terms of cumulative GDP loss), so population and elite alike accepted readily the new system, which very quickly (almost within weeks)
became a major cognitive model and an way of thinking about economy and money. We can definitely say that the currency board, which subsequently outlived the Russian and the Asian crises as well as the collapse of the currency board in Argentina (curiously, even in this critical for currency board arrangements time, in Bulgaria the system received the public's unreserved support and unfailing confidence), became the leading anchor 10 . The anchor pulled the country out of the critical situation of corruption and banditism and steered it to years of prosperity and successful EU membership. Subsequently, after some wavering regarding the economic and legal compatibility of the currency board with Bulgaria's membership in EU, and the adoption of the exchange-rate mechanism in particular, the European institutions decided in favour of its compatibility although it remained a unilateral responsibility of the country operating it. Today, Bulgaria and Lithuania continue to operate their currency boards, while Estonia is the only Currency board country that joined the euro area following the beginning of the financial and debt crisis in Europe (as of 1 January 2011). The issue of whether the currency board today is of disadvantage or of benefit to Bulgaria in the current crisis is open to dispute. However, the facts show that the Bulgarian public continues to regard it as a major institutionally proven anchor, although with the time passing the social memory about 1996/97 crisis begins to weaken (Mudd and al. 2010 ).
Unlike Bulgaria, Romania has never given up its discretionary policy and its central bank has always held the full range of tools typical for any contemporary and modern bank. Even after Bulgaria made its choice to operate a currency board and somewhat later when the currency boards, and corner solutions in general gained wide popularity, Romania never hesitated to continue its path of active monetary policy and exchange rate management. It should be mentioned that Romania too experienced a similar in character, while not in depth, crisis in of Deputy Governor Christian Popa (Popa, 2003) . It is also worthy of note that even in previous periods when non-intervention in the forex market and floating exchange rate were proclaimed, the bank de facto interfered, according to the calculations of Frommel and Shobert (2006) . It should also be mentioned that inflation targeting implies a floating exchange rate because it is controversial (not to say impossible) for a central bank to employ two anchors at the same time, in this particular case nominal exchange rate and inflation 13 .
After it became clear that Romania would not be bypassed by the crisis, its central bank started reducing the interest rates (4% cumulative reduction since the beginning of 2009), as well as the statutory reserves, pursuing a policy of monetary easing (IMF, 2010) . The decision to increase VAT by 5 % (despite the 25% reduction of public sector wages and 15% reduction of social transfers) led to an automatic surge of inflation in mid-2010. This compelled the central bank to temporarily stop the trend of interest rate reduction and breaching of the price 11 For detailed account of the evolution of the Bulgarian political system from 1878 to present, see Todorov (2010) . 12 Isarescu speaks of cultural conditions for the adoption of inflation targeting (Isarescu, 2009, pp. 19-20) . 13 On departures from inflation targeting in the new member-states, see … target (which was 3,5% + 1, with 7-8% inflation as of end-2010) (see IMF, 2010 , NBR, 2010 In an earlier study, one of us argues that post-communist countries in general are divisible into two groups, according to the type of monetary regime operated at the onset of transition (Nenovsky, 2009 ). The successful countries are the ones that started the transition with fixed exchange rates and strict monetary policies, part of which subsequently moved to a floating exchange rate (Central Europe), while others preserved it (the Baltic countries). This model is a winning one, because the fixed exchange rate regime gives more possibilities for overcoming the bandit and crony transition, and in general indicates willingness for integration into the European world, which is the new geostrategic choice. The group of losing countries includes those of the countries that started the transition with a floating rate, whose fluctuations provided a rich soil for manipulations and numerous embezzlement and bandit schemes. Romania and Bulgaria fell under the second group of countries.
In order to explain the behaviour of the two countries in the last ten years, as well as answer the above questions, we need to systematise what we have so far presented into a theoretical framework.
III. Theoretical hypotheses and empirical illustrations
At this stage of the analysis it would be appropriate to formulate the following theoretical hypotheses, or theoretical assertions, which could subsequently be illustrated (we avoid using the term "proved") by statistical data and empirical examples from the practice of the two countries. 16 . 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1966-1970 1971-1975 1981-1983 1984-1986 1987-1989 1990-1992 1993-1995 1966-1970 1971-1975 1981-1983 1984-1986 1987-1989 1990-1992 1993-1995 Because the currency board is a discipline-inducing and conservative mechanism, he gives the private sector more space and restricts the behaviour of the government. The economic activity and all risks concentrated in the private sector and the individuals (such as demand for credit, investments, etc.). The private sector is the one, which has to adjust to the hard budget constraints, to develop equilibrating mechanisms. The public sector and public finances follow by themselves the basic principles of behaviour of the private sector, i.e., the aim is about the two keeping a constant equilibrium and even generating net savings (budget surplus) (chart 3) . The requirement for the private sector adjustments, under fixed exchange rate and lack of monetary policy, leads to lower unit labour cots and wage flexibility (chart 4 to 9)
The situation in Romania counter-mirrors that in Bulgaria. Here, the public sector has no such restriction: it can always rely on the central bank, which in turn holds up its reformation and leads to deficits and accumulation of public debt. Hence, the debt structure tends to follow a relatively higher level of the public debt at the cost of the private one, whereas in Bulgaria the propensity of the private sector to incur debt is considerably higher than that of the public sector. This applies equally to the external and the internal debt. Moreover, the currency board, by reducing the foreign exchange risk, leads to moderation of the overall level of risk in the country and lowers the interest rate levels to those abroad, opening the economy and therefore increasing the country's exposure to external shocks. National economy follows passively global economy developments.
Thus, in general, the Currency board, due to its system-making and "pulling" importance, leads to deep changes in the other leading institutions and characteristics of the economy, either slower or quicker. The essential thing is that it creates conditions for the formation of habits and discipline, and certain barriers to banditism and corruption, and all sorts of crony practices.
Therefore, we logically arrive at the third hypothesis, which is related with the processes of EU accession and membership, and partly with the possibility of joining the euro area.
Chart 3 Public balances in Bulgaria and Romania
Source: National Bank of Romania, Bulgarian National Bank Theoretically, the case in point is the compatibility or complementarity of two basic institutions, of two major social anchors, which form and coordinate the expectations of economic actors. There is every reason to assume that the monetary regimes and the EU anchor are in conflict, since the EU membership triggers behaviour, which clashes with the principles of behaviour under a currency board arrangement. This happens primarily after a country gains full membership in terms of loosening constraints, slackening discipline and increasing moral hazard. 17 The entire model is exposed in Nenovsky (2010) , graphical interpretation in Nenovsky and Villieu (2011) . Empirical illustration of the original Dolley's model is given in Chinn and al. (1999) . 
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The logic of this moral hazard (or insurance game a la Dolley) could be shortly exposed in a following way (for formal presentation see appendix). When government foreign assets became bigger that its foreign liabilities, the difference became to be viewed as collateral (free insurance) for private sector liabilities. This inflow of capital starts and the private debt, mainly foreign, but not only, start to rise. In fact, at the beginning the EU anchor and monetary anchor are rather compatible, because the EU credibility is reinforced by the discipline effect, but once membership realised these two effects start to contradict each other.
The discipline is lost and the credibility effect has perverse effects. Our observation is in the close accord with Luengnaruemitchai and Schadler (2007) 18 For some inspiring idea about crises classification, see Marzinotto and al. (2010) . Of all said so far, we could derive one additional assertion when we look at another similar, although distant in time economic past, namely the years of the Great Depression of 1930s.
Our point here is that within certain frames the current comparative history of Bulgaria and Romania repeats the comparative history of the Great Depression period.
IV. Back to the history (1925-1940)
Overall, the economic and political development of Bulgaria and Romania in the inter-war period did not differ substantially as evidenced by the key economic indicators, which although with some conditionality, were quite close, not to say the same. (1926 and 1928) , which ensured the foreign reserves needed for the coverage of the currency in circulation. The public finances were brought to balance mainly by restricting expenditures and the Central Bank conducted deflationary policy and a policy of high discount rate. Overall, this policy did not differ from that of the other countries, neither in terms of philosophy, nor of practice. What actually became, over time, a distinctive feature of Bulgaria's economic and financial politics, which subsequently came to prevail, was its orthodoxality and adherence to the principles of the gold standard, the fiscal discipline, and a strict and almost "martyr's" servicing of the huge external obligations. Although Bulgarian politicians and economists repeated over and over again how huge and unfair the obligations were, as these truly were, Bulgaria continued to remit amounts due under various reparation debts. Governments fell one after another because of the difficulties to refund these debts, with the signing of new loan agreements, but payments never stopped.
Bulgaria is among the few countries, perhaps the only one on the Balkans, which never defaulted. Due to its political isolation after WWI, however, its endeavours as a good payer
were not recognised and it had to shoulder its liabilities with almost no relief (Ivanov, 2001 (Ivanov, , 2004 . In his speech marking the BNB's 50th anniversary, then-prime minister Andrey Lyapchev said, "one would be hard put to find quite such a young nation in quite such exacerbated circumstances as ours these past fifty years, yet one which can boast that it has ever occupied the position of an exemplary payer to its foreign creditors" (BNB, 2001,135) .
Bulgaria is among the few countries that never abandoned the gold standard, and especially the fixed exchange rate. Bulgaria, like most other countries, introduced exchange control in 1931, but unlike them, it never devalued. Although often argued that this type of exchange control is de facto abandoning one of the basic principles of the gold standard, there are a number of arguments to think otherwise. Because not only is it unclear why the exchange control in Bulgaria, as well as that in Romania, were so very different from the exchange control in England, or even France, for instance, it is also unclear when Bulgaria and Romania became full members of the bloc of countries running exchange control.
Certainly, like today, the choice of an orthodox monetary regime in Bulgaria was initially dictated primarily by the condition of debt and public finances.
As already mentioned, Bulgaria was a debtor country which considered debt service a key priority. In fact, Bulgaria was an extremely diligent payer who pursued to preserve its reputation through debt service. With respect to structure, Bulgaria's debt was denominated in gold backed leva and was mostly owed to non-devaluing countries. According to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, "in Bulgaria it is almost certain that the transfer question has predominated" (1936, 98) and the purpose of maintaining the currency on a gold basis "has presumably been to avoid an increase in the costs of the foreign debt service" (1936, 129) . Later, the balance of payments constraints were particularly tight, and not only as regards foreign debt service. The prices of agricultural products, which accounted for the major part of Bulgarian exports, fell sharply on international markets and aggravated terms of trade. The
September 1932 Stresa Conference which focused on possible assistance to Southern European countries (a major part of the so-called 'agrarian bloc') noted that the price drop reached 70 per cent (Bonnet, 1933, 21) . A fund concentrating revenue from the sale of agricultural products to developed countries was proposed to be used as partial debt service (the United Kingdom vetoed it).
Systematic exchange control could be interpreted as a defence against restrictions introduced by Bulgaria's trading partners. The farming price drop was combined with a number of restrictions on the import of agrarian products to Germany and France with a view to protecting indigenous farmers through economic and political means (Raupach, 1969) .
Turkey, an important Bulgarian trading neighbour, also introduced some limitations on Bulgarian imports. In April 1932 the drachma joined the devaluers' club and Bulgaria lost its competitive and long-standing positions on the Greek market.
Let us now turn to Romania 19 , which although, as was mentioned earlier, followed the trends common, first, for all countries, and second, for the Balkan and peripheral economies, it nevertheless had some important differences. After the Wars, Romania's economy followed similar developments as those in Bulgaria.
The leu was slow to stabilise and lagged by a few years behind the stabilisation of the who was a key figure in the story with the gold deposit. The gold had for a long time been accounted for in the balance sheet of the National Bank of Romania (unlike the National "Their society was deeply marked by the years under the corrupt Ottoman rule. Romanians had a saying: "The fish grows rotten from the head". In Romania, almost everything was for sale: offices, licences, passports. Indeed, a foreign journalist who once tried to change money legally instead of on the black market was thrown into jail by a police officer who thought he might be involved in a particularly clever swindle." (MacMillan, 2003 (MacMillan, , [2001 , p. 129.
Bank of Bulgaria, it was 90% owned by private shareholders) and was included in the coverage of the currency circulation only in 1929 during the legal stabilisation of the leu. As compensation, and following the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, already in February 1922 the Ministry of Finance gave a portion to the Central Bank, which Romania received as indemnity along with war compensations (for details see Blejan and al., 2008; .
In the case of Romania, a crucial role for retaining the fixed exchange rate and furthering stabilisation was played by the French economists and bankers (Charles Rist in particular). Third, already at the time of introducing the exchange control a fluctuation of the exchange rate within the band of 5%-15% occurred, and later on an exchange premium between the official exchange rate and the exchange rate on the black market. In November 1936
(following the devaluation of the French franc), de facto devaluation was realized by revaluing the gold reserves. Practically all foreign reserves of Romania are in gold). This devaluation is around 38% according to Blejan et al. (2009, p. 14) Table 7 Germany's share in the foreign trade in Bulgaria and in Romania, 1933 Romania, -1939 Romania, 1933 Romania, 1937 Romania, 1938 Romania, 1939 Bulgaria 38. Bulgaria and a small one with Romania), runs throughout the overall economic system of the two countries and their economic policy. Bulgaria being more in the direction of the "private sector", concentrating both the economic activity as well as the whole range of shocks, response mechanisms and self-equilibrium, while in Romania, in contrast, it was the state and the public finances that played a significant role by being both a reason for and a response mechanism to imbalances.
The polarity of choices of the monetary regimes shaped the ways of thinking of the economists and politicians of the two countries. While in Bulgaria, eulogy of static monetary regimes of the past prevailed and any form of activism was denied, it was quite the opposite in Romania where the economists vied with each other in constructing models and describing the complex mechanisms of inflation targeting and monetary policy. A look back at the interwar period reveals -perhaps accidentally or perhaps not -some recurring patterns of the behaviour of the two countries, which were then associated with monetary stabilisation and monetary regime.
The EU membership plus excess liquidity globally, coupled with the difference in their monetary regimes, has led to two relatively diverging configurations of moral hazard behaviour. In Bulgaria, moral hazard and the insurance game after Dooley's game model, which we regard as appropriate explanatory theoretical miniature models, were concentrated in the private sector and the strong growth of private debt. In Romania, while not disregarding the indebtedness of the public sector, the public sector, public finances and public debt reacted much more quickly, thus leading to problems in 2009 and to the signing of an agreement with IMF.
Today (early 2011), the future of the two countries is not clear, just as it is not clear how the present crisis will evolve. As an African saying goes, "When you don't know where you are going to, better know where you are coming from".
The theoretical issue presented here about the role of the monetary regime as an economic anchor and its complementarity with the external (geo) political anchor, in this particular case EU is promising topic and deserves new theoretical and empirical analyses.
Appendices: Formalization of insurance model (hypotheses 3)
The model could be presented using the following functional relations (see for more details We are examining three periods, of course with all conditionalities. The first period, Т1, covers the time before the start of negotiations for EU membership. The second period, Т2, after start of negotiations until accession, and the third period, Т3, is the period after the official entry. While the first period is characterised by the existence of one anchor, in this case λ 1 , which reflects the monetary regime (either exchange rate target or inflation target), in the second and third period a second, already external, anchor emerges (EU membership), λ 2 .
While in Т1 this anchor plays a mobilizing, stimulating and disciplining role for the countries heading for membership, and overall both anchors -internal and external -move in a single direction and act in synchrony.
Thus in Т2: In this period Т3 there is every logical and empirical evidence to assume that the second, external anchor -EU membership -brings detriment to and undermines the credibility of the monetary regime anchor (-γ 1 ). Besides, in equation (3), we add the second anchor λ 2 in explaining foreign reserves dynamics. Of course, at first approximation, the functional correlations are taken as linear, which is clearly a simplification, because non-linear dependences could be surmised 22 .
In Т1, after transformations, we arrive at the following dependence between insurance premium and anchor credibility: It is clear that while in the first two periods deposit demand is magnified first by one, then by both anchors through reducing the risk premium, at T3 a reversal occurs with non-residents starting to withdraw their deposits, or at worst, the inflow quickly subsides. Chart 16 shows the presumable relations between anchor λ 1 and insurance premium α in the examined periods Т1, Т2 and Т3. 22 We could presume for example that the premium movement depends not only on the level, but also on the rate of growth of foreign reserves 
